this is not the whole of the story, nor the main reason for its historical importance. The fracture issue was integral to the shift in this century to a focus on accidents and trauma-a shift of focus with wide but understudied implications.4 Although the First World War "cast a halo" on trauma and brought the concern with it on to a par with disease entities, the halo might well have slipped had it not been for the proponents of fracture services during the interwar period.5 But because accidents and trauma cut across the "organ geography" of medical and surgical specialties, the attempt to shift the focus was to raise serious problems of conceptualization as well as of hospital organization. As we shall see, it was in relation to these problems especially that the efficient treatment of fractures became central to the politics of British hospital reform before the Second World War.
WAR GAINS AND POST-WAR LOSSES
The common belief that modern orthopaedics derives in large part from traditional bone-setting appears to legitimate orthopaedic surgeons as the rightful menders of broken bones.6 But, in fact, it was only through the First World War that orthopaedists as a professional body brought the treatment of fractures within the scope of their specialism.7 (Indeed, it was largely as a result of the wartime work with fractures that professional association re-emerged and was made permanent.) Hitherto, orthopaedics had been almost wholly concerned with the correction of chronic deformities, especially among children. Although from the 1890s the therapeutic techniques of fracture treatment were increasingly the subject of medical attention (leading to a BMA report in 1912),8 the practice of fracture treatment had remained largely in the hands ofgeneral practitioners and hospital general surgeons. The only exception was the work of Robert Jones in Liverpool, and that was conducted in a private clinic (mostly for the treatment ofindustrial injuries) established by his uncle, the general practitioner, Hugh Owen Thomas.9 How orthopaedists secured the treatment of fractures during the war through the political and organizational genius of Robert Jones does not concern us here;10 more important to note is that, after the war, orthopaedists were unable to carry over into civilian hospital practice their military control of fractures, largely because of opposition from old-guard general surgeons (especially in London). To these "reactionaries", as Jones and his colleagues referred to them, orthopaedics appeared the most conspicuous of several insurgent specialisms threatening completely to outmode general surgery. By 1918, not only had vast portions ofgeneral surgery been hived offinto seventeen specially designated military orthopaedic centres (commanding over 25,000 beds)," and not only had some two dozen ambitious disciples of Jones come together (in February 1918) to form the British Orthopaedic Association (BOA); but also the specialism had acquired an exhalted public image as a result ofthe rehabilitation ofdisabled soldiers. Jones's wartime "headquarters"-the Shepherd's Bush Military Orthopaedic Hospital in London-had become a national symbol of the success of wartime medicine.
The "old guard" were also well aware that orthopaedics in Jones's hands represented certain anti-traditional and distinctly unpleasant American tendencies.12 Before the war, Jones, along with other outstanding British surgeons, had been a member of Sir Berkeley Moynihan's Provincial Surgeons' Association, a visibly modernist group deeply influenced by American surgery and the "scientific" hospital organization that had emerged in America during the Progressive Era.'3 It was those within or identifying with For fuller discussion of the orthopaedists' involvement with the war, as well as their involvement with crippled children, industry, and organized labour and other areas referred to here only in passing, see my forthcoming book on the social history of orthopaedics.
I I According to the Army Council Instruction (A.C. I 72, 1916) devised by Jones, the following were to be sent to the military orthopaedic hospitals: (I) cases of plastic surgery of face, neck and jaw; (2) any case of deformity or disability of the feet; (3) any case of mal-united fracture or un-united fracture; (4) any case of fracture of the femur; (5) any case of derangement or disability of joints; (6) any case requiring a special surgical appliance; (7) any case of nerve lesion requiring treatment. It is a fact, at any rate, that immediately after the war a committee of the council of the College sought to circumscribe orthopaedics, regarding with "mistrust and disapprobation the movement in progress to remove the treatment ofconditions always properly regarded as the main portion of the general surgeon's work from his hands, and place it in those of 'Orthopaedic specialists' '.15 Thus, in large part because oftheir professional achievements under Jones during the war, orthopaedists found their post-war path obstructed. Moreover, while the teaching hospital establishment had no intention of "letting in" orthopaedists, the military orthopaedics centres were returned to their pre-war uses. The Shepherd's Bush Hospital, for example, despite efforts by Jones to turn it into a postgraduate orthopaedic teaching centre, was repossessed by the Hammersmith Guardians in 1924 and restored as a Poor House and Infirmary. Quite literally in many cases, the "modernists" in orthopaedics were forced out into the country, there to be involved with open-air hospitals for crippled children, dealing mainly with cases of rickets and tuberculosis of the bones and joints. A decade after the war, no less than fifty-four of the by then ninety-four senior members of the BOA had resident or consultancy positions at these and other children's hospitals (sixteen ofthem holding more than one such appointment), as did forty-two of the sixty-seven junior or "associate" members. Although this area of their work cannot be gone into here, it is worth pointing out that the "national scheme" for the orthopaedic care of crippled children that Jones and his colleagues devised in 1919, and to which they were more or less compelled to devote their post-war energies, had largely met with success by the late 1920s, when some two dozen or so pukka orthopaedic hospitals had been brought into existence along with countless orthopaedic clinics.16 For the most part, it was in the wake of this accomplishment, made outside the major centres of British medicine, that orthopaedists came to concentrate on the issue of fractures-the planning, organization, and rhetoric for which to some extent overlapped.
THE PILOT FRACTURE CLINIC
To the general picture of the failure of orthopaedic surgeons to secure the control of fracture treatment in the immediate post-war period there were, however, two notable exceptions-the work of Meurice Sinclair, conducted at the St James Poor Law Hospital, Balham, London, and that of Harry Platt at the Ancoats Hospital, Manchester. Sinclair's work derived directly from his pre-eminent wartime handling of fractures at a base hospital in France, and it was to have considerable bearing on LCC thinking on fracture services in the 1930s. But it was little noticed before then, neither was Sinclair a member of the BOA until 1935, though he regarded himself as professionally indebted to Jones.17 Platt, by contrast, was a founder member of the BOA, and his work at Ancoats was intended from the start as a demonstration of orthopaedic specialization. In this, as in much of his other work, Platt was greatly influenced both by Jones and by American models.
After graduating in medicine at Manchester in 191 1, Platt had gone to London to "round off" his education by gaining experience at the specialist hospitals of St Peter's (genito-urinary), St. Mark's (colo-rectal), and the Royal National Orthopaedic. 18 Platt was not at this time seeking to become a specialist, but while he was at the RNOH in 1913, he was invited by the head of the Orthopaedic Service of the Massachusetts General Hospital to further his training in Boston. The experience was decisive; the MGH, with the Boston Children's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, was then the world's leading centre for orthopaedics, embracing all that was most advanced in American medicine. Platt The Ancoats Hospital was only a small voluntary hospital-a typical place for a junior appointment-but in many ways it was ideally suited to a surgeon with budding orthopaedic interests. For one thing, both of the other surgeons, John Morley (later Professor of Surgery at Manchester University) and W. R. Douglas (later a renowned cancer surgeon at Manchester's Christie Hospital) were also young, ambitious and willing to try out new ideas and techniques. For another, the situation of the hospital, in one of Manchester's densest industrial districts, rendered it essentially an accident hospital with a large turnover of fracture cases.20 Finally, and not least, the hospital had a relatively liberal board of managers.
Here, then, was a propitious setting in which to try out American-style reforms, and within months of his appointment, Platt was conspiring with Morley and Douglas to do just that. Instead of each taking all the cases admitted during a period of duty, the three colleagues divided cases (and the seventy-five beds) according to surgical specialities. By this means, Platt was able to establish a uniformity of therapeutic control over all the incoming fracture (and other orthopaedic) cases.2'
None of this brought rebuke from the lay managers of Ancoats, though when Platt was appointed he had had to promise not to indulge only in specialist work. Since the specialization he was proposing could be seen as meeting the needs of the publicespecially the needs of the locality's industrial workers, who were also (through workers' contribution schemes and the Hospital Saturday Fund) an increasingly important source ofhospital funding-the lay governors had no reason to fear that the specialization would serve only professional interests.22 It may have been important, too, that the governors could see the specialization as emerging from the co-operative efforts of their own consultants, rather than as something imposed from outside and challenging their autonomy. The secretary of the hospital, far from expressing worry over the new division of labour, was apparently more concerned about the effect of orthopaedic specialization on Platt's own financial future, since, as everyone knew, fractures, no less than chronic musculo-skeletal deformities, were primarily the lot of the poor and therefore held out little promise for remunerative private practice-the main benefit from honorary hospital appointments.23 This financial aspect may also help to explain the willingness of Morley and Douglas to comply with Platt's reformism, as may the fact that fractures, when not regarded simply as an unchallenging area ofmedicine, were seen as professionally risky-a case of mal-union having the potential to ruin a surgeon's reputation. 24 The strategic potential for rising specialisms in the smaller hospitals (at least in the Manchester region) was also illustrated at the Salford Royal Hospital, where Platt's friend and wartime colleague, Geoffrey Jefferson, was allowed to concentrate on neurosurgery.25 But it was much more difficult for orthopaedists to carve out specialist niches in the major teaching hospitals where their interests threatened the physical territory (beds) and the confidence claims of general surgeons. In some London hospitals, orthopaedic departments were established fromjust before the war. But these were largely for chronic cases, rather than the victims of accidents, and were under the control of general surgeons rather than aspiring specialist surgeons. In fact (as we will see below), one of the staunchest opponents of the orthopaedic specialists in the 1 920s was George E. Gask, who in the 1900s had himself been Chief Assistant to the Orthopaedic Department at St Bartholomew's Hospital. 26 During World War I, Platt was deeply involved with Manchester's military orthopaedic centre at Grangethorpe; his plans for Ancoats were delayed a little, but his experience was enlarged and his commitment to "progressive orthopaedics" strengthened.27 After the war, between 1919 and 1921, Platt was able to establish the world's first segregated fracture service under the control of an orthopaedic surgeon. He carried over into civilian practice the main wartime lessons of effective fracture treatment: segregation, expert supervision, team-work, continuity of treatment, and appropriate after-care. To these features he added detailed record-keeping on the social and medical condition of patients, a technique he had learned in Boston and which, applied generally, was basic to the scientific management of American hospitals.28
These were the essential principles of the "ideal fracture service" which Platt reported in the Lancet in 1921; they were to be reiterated in the barrage of papers and lectures issued by orthopaedists from the mid-1920s to the 1940s; and they were to receive the backing of the medical establishment in the BMA's highly influential 'Report on fractures ' (1935 The long interval between the establishment of the fracture clinic at Ancoats and the publication of the above reports strongly suggests that example alone was not sufficient to make the treatment of fractures a public issue. Nor would it be right to maintain that consciousness was raised merely by the rhetoric of zealous orthopaedists. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the few, but influential, orthopaedists to whom this paper refers, was all-important, for it was largely on the basis of their claims about the opposition to segregated fracture treatment (more so than by any extolling of new technologies or esoteric operative techniques and skills), that the campaign for the orthopaedic control of fractures was conducted. Platt's recollection is illuminating in this respect: "In the years between the wars the field of orthopaedics was to those of us then young an expanding universe, and we fought the battle for the control of fractures with gusto.... Our opponents often accused us ofadopting the attitude ofthe German philosopher Nietzche
[sic]-'that a good fight sanctifies a cause'.,"30 Thus cast, the fracture cause was more than merely the bid ofa specialist group for hospital space; it was recognizably a part ofa wider movement against the obstacles to reform in British hospital medicine.
Among the more important of the battles for the control of fractures was that precipitated by Robert Jones through a published lecture delivered in Liverpool in May 1925.31 Regarded by friend and foe alike as a "slashing attack on the 'Methods by which fractures are dealt with at the big teaching hospitals' ", Jones's lecture had, in fact, been encouraged by Platt Jones opened his lecture with the observation that the existing treatment of fractures was "a blot upon our surgical escutcheon". He decried as "hopelessly wrong" the situation existing in "the big teaching hospitals" where out-patient ambulatory fractures were treated by impermanent and unsupervised junior medical officers, and where in-patient fractures-ostensibly of little interest to honorary surgeons who resented them for blocking beds-were left to the care of house surgeons whose job consisted simply of putting up the fractures in plaster and sending patients out at the first opportunity-"A more unscientific and certainly less satisfactory method it is not easy to conceive".33 And he portrayed "as even more pathetic" the fate of those fracture cases sent to Poor Law infirmaries that were totally unfitted for the modern treatment of fractures. Yet (and this was typical of most of his fellow-advocates of fracture clinics), Jones had few statistics to offer as evidence for the general surgeons' "old bad way" of treating fractures. Indeed, their badness, he maintained, "[did] not admit of argument". Nor did he anywhere make the claim for specialized fracture treatment on the basis of orthopaedic access to new techniques or skills-he himself was never more than a weak advocate of the open-plating of fractures-nor did he extol the benefits of X-rays, though he was a pioneer in their use.34 Convinced that better functional results in fracture treatment would come from their being handled by properly trained experts, he could refer only to the principles ofcare worked out during the war, which had resulted in a reputed twenty per cent reduction in mortality from fractures.
Such rhetoric did more than merely represent fractures as a major surgical problem to be solved by hospital fracture clinics like Platt's at Ancoats. Knowing that his demand for "efficient" fracture services would be seen as the call for the entry of orthopaedic specialists into the major hospitals, and hence as an assault on convention, Jones pulled out every stop to legitimate exactly that. Claiming that what he was suggesting was "neither difficult in conception nor revolutionary to bring into effect", he made li11ght of "the natural inclination on the part of the general surgeon to resist what he fears to be an encroachment of specialism", arguing that this fear was a thing of the past and that general surgeons were, for a variety of reasons, only too willing to hand over their fracture cases: "The average hospital surgeon takes neither pride nor scientific interest in the treatment offractures. He knows it himself, his house-surgeons know it, and so do the students. Wherein and with whom lies an advantage? No! it is not a mere matter of the encroachment of specialism, but a call to our sense of proportion and sense of duty. Whether we use the term 'specialism' or not, there is no mind so comprehensive that it can keep pace with all the requirements of modern surgery." With regard to the introduction of orthopaedics into the "already too overcrowded" medical curriculum (and hence orthopaedists into the teaching hospitals), Jones subtly side-stepped the issue by arguing in general for the benefits of a reformed teaching structure that would simplify and clarify instruction and make it more efficient. Perhaps recalling his own training under the guidance of his uncle, Jones argued for intensive training under experts, and (in fact echoing a late-nineteenth-century debate) extolled the out-patients' department as affording students "a better equipment in after-life than academic lectures, the matter of which they can equally well glean from textbooks."35 Since much of his own work had been conducted in a private accident clinic, it is not surprising that he elevated the status of the hospital territory where the vast majority of fracture cases were treated.
Finally, Jones endeavoured to nip criticism in the bud by appealing to the patient's own best interests. To urge "that our hospitals are already too crowded", he said, "is but poor comfort to a young working man sent off to a Poor Law infirmary, with a wife and family dependent upon him. It is inefficient treatment and neglect which transforms a simple fracture to a chronic deformity. It is far better for our hospital authorities to say, 'We are not prepared to treat fractures,' than that they should take on responsibilities which they cannot meet.... We cannot disguise the fact that great numbers of adult cripples are manufactured by want of adequate provision."
It was this "plain speaking", as Jones himself called it, while disclaiming "any spirit of hostility", that set the stage for the expected confrontation. This took place at the BMA meeting in Bath in August 1925 during a special session on 'Surgery and Orthopaedics' in which the discussion was on the treatment of fractures.36 It was here that George Gask made his debut as the defender of generalism over surgical specialism. How Gask came to open the proceedings is not clear; it is known, however, that Platt and Bristow helped ensure that the session was chaired by Moynihan (an honorary member of the BOA), and that there was an illustrious audience of orthopaedists (some from as far afield as Boston and the Mayo Clinic).37 35 Though Gask (by this time the Director of the Professional Surgical Unit at St Bartholomew's Hospital) was hardly a conventional opponent of specialization, it was almost impossible for him to emerge from the proceedings at Bath as other than a "quixotic [defender] .. . of a losing cause".38 If this indeed was the "role" that the organizers of the meeting intended for him, he filled it admirably, for by deprecating the "artificial and totally unnecessary separation between surgery and medicine" as "the greatest blow the profession ever sustained", he presented himself as a backward-looking "romantic" radically at odds with the reformist "scientific" outlook of the orthopaedists.39 To the modernists in orthopaedics who imagined "progress" in explicitly Spencerian terms of greater efficiency through greater division of labour,40 Gask could only retort that the extended division of labour which served the needs of the munitions factory hardly applied best to the manufacture of good general practitioners. But for the orthopaedists, the education of general practitioners (for which Gask mostly spoke) was neither here nor there; they linked the appalling (albeit meagre) statistics on bad fracture treatment in Britain with the fact, made clear at the meeting, "that probably one half of the fractures in this country were treated at home or in cottage hospitals by general practitioners", and concluded that fractures needed to be treated under their own expert supervision.4'
The incompetence of general practitioners was to become a larger part of orthopaedic rhetoric in the 1930s, though it was never to move to centre stage (nor were there ever to be statistics on either the extent of the treatment of fractures by general practitioners or on their clinical results). So far as one can tell, general practitioners orthopaedist, John Prentiss Lord, in which evidence was sought for the merits of hospital fracture services in the hands of orthopaedists. Lord's highly favourable findings constituted the basis of his address to the section of orthopaedic surgery of the AMA in 1927, which, in turn, was the basis for the editorial on fracture treatment in the Br (unlike some hospital general surgeons) did not feel threatened by the advent of fracture specialists,42 nor had most of them much reason to be, since to refer a patient to a specialist or to a special hospital department was not to lose that patient from one's "panel" list or to forfeit National Insurance remuneration. Orthopaedists, for their part, thus had little reason not to continue to regard the consultant opponents of specialization as the main targets of their rhetoric. However, after the meeting at Bath, they tended to keep off the issues of specialization and education per se, and to focus instead on what they rightly regarded as virtually "unassailable" by anyone: the practical means to achieving the best possible functional results in the treatment of fractures. This was how Jones pitched his reply to Gask, and, by 1928, when the budding proponent of fracture services, Ernest Hey Groves, delivered his presidential address to the BOA 'On the Treatment of Fractures', it was above all this less contentious, practical side of the issue that was emphasized as "the problem".43 The solution to the problem, it was increasingly stressed, was "not new knowledge"-least ofall new technology or new research into methods for the internal or external fixation of fractures-but merely "the organized application of the knowledge we already possess", namely, the "segregation of cases, the training of team workers, and the systematic tabulation of results". Left unspoken were the political implications of this application of knowledge from the point of view of the organization and structure of British hospitals. Left unspoken, too, it should be added, was the shrinking market for orthopaedists consequent upon the success of the orthopaedic scheme for crippled children combined with the declining incidence of rickets and "surgical tuberculosis" of the bone and joints.44
The debate at Bath is a good illustration of how specialization was negotiated in post-war Britain. But far wider issues were also involved here. Close to the surface of the debate, and in the fabric of its rhetoric, lay the pressing question of the health services reform.
The early 1920s were, by and large, a period of retrenchment in health care, but the financial crisis that lay behind that retrenchment also provided an increasingly compelling argument for fundamental change. Although in 1921 the Cave Committee, in its Report on voluntary hospitals, mostly sought only to shore up the existing system, 42 See editorials in the Practitioner, 1936 what is evident, however, is that the concepts of "continuity of treatment", "team work", and the "unification of control" over all hospital facilities and services were basic to the scheme. This similarity with the rhetoric of the orthopaedic reformers was not, ofcourse, coincidental; it reflects, rather, the shared faith in rationalization among the reform-minded, or in the application of "system and uniformity" to apparent problems of ever-greater complexity and waste. As is well known, this faith in rationalization (an ideology informing the problems it sought to solve) was drawn more or less directly from the world of American commerce and industry where the "scientific" principles of bureaucratic management had proven themselves "rational" from the point of view of economic efficiency.46
But the campaign for the standardization and co-ordination of hospital services in Britain was more than merely the extension of the principles of rationalization as they were beginning to be applied to post-war industry, transport, and agriculture (as well as to trade unions). For the TUC and Labour Party, the call for the rationalization of hospital services was a part of a bid for an egalitarian distribution of medical power and provision in a state medical service. As such, their plans were different in principle from those contained in the Dawson Report of 1920. There were also fundamental differences of focus and concern. In the Dawson Report, the argument for rationalization was focused on general practice, rather than on hospitals, and there was little reference to accident and emergency services. In the TUC and Labour Party's vision of a unified and classless medical system, hospitals were more important,47 and the accident service was held to be the front line ofmedical care-the essential base to a pyramid of services ascending to university-linked national hospitals.48 To promote a uniform, co-ordinated accident system was to criticize the existing unequal, haphazard and confused hospital system. Here, as nowhere else in medicine, it could be made apparent that in order to meet the needs of patient populations it was vital and urgent-as vital and urgent as in World War I-to have a regionally co-ordinated, fully rationalized hospital system. Ideally, too, this would be a hospital system in which there would be (again as in the recent war) a salaried medical service, since there could be no scope for private practice in the treatment of acute injury.
To no group in medicine was this line of argument more pertinent than to the orthopaedic advocates of fracture services. But there was little hope of implementing 45 such schemes in the financial climate of the early 1920s. Although the TUC and Labour Party proposals shifted the focus of reform on to hospital services rather than general practice, for accident services to be an effective instrument of rationalization more would be required than the force of argument. Certainly, to understand how the rhetoric of the orthopaedic reformers came to have impact in the 1930s, it is important to appreciate not just the wider political context of reform, but also the more immediate external pressures that were increasingly coming to bear on the reform of accident services. In particular, reference can be made to the 1924 Report on the disposal of ambulance cases; to the growth of concern over the incidence of motor vehicle accidents; and to the influential model for the handling of accident cases, the Vienna Accident Hospital.
PRESSURE FROM WITHOUT
The first of these sources of pressure in the inter-war period, the Report on the disposal of ambulance cases, was prepared by a committee of the King Edward's Hospital Fund for London-a body specifically established for the rationalization of the voluntary hospitals. Primarily concerned with the costs, distribution, and availability of hospital beds for accident cases and with the proper "relationship to be observed between ... rate-supported institutions and the Voluntary Hospitals", the report also made apparent that, for all intents and purposes, the metropolis was without an accident service.49 The LCC's Ambulance Service, which had been organized in 1915 and was attending some 24,626 calls with its seven ambulances by 1923, was constantly faced with the problem of where to take patients. situation in London appeared antediluvian. Although the committee of the King's Fund stuck to their brief, it was evident from their report that not only was there an urgent need for "uniformity of procedure", but also for the centralization and co-ordination of accident services in London, if not for the control of these services under a single specialist group.
The second source of pressure for reform, the rise in the number of motor vehicle accidents, became prominent around the same time as the Report and, indeed, was not separate from the latter's concerns.52 It is ironic, ofcourse, that motorization, which in the form of ambulance transport was vital to the post-war plans for accident services, was also a major cause of the injuries that were to require speedier transport. "Before the era of the motor car", commented the Lancet in 1926, "the receiving officer of a large general hospital might be embarrassed by a run of Pott's fractures on the first snowy evening of the year; today a fine Sunday evening may overwhelm any cottage hospital with a glut of complicated injuries."53 For England and Wales, non-fatal street accidents involving motor vehicles increased four-fold between 1913 and 1932: from 38,000 to 162,000, with the most striking rise (unsurpassed until the 1950s) occurring between 1927 and 1934.54 And, as the Ministry of Transport was acutely aware in 1928, "There are few questions, as reference to the daily press will show, which excite more constant and widespread interest."55 Although the number of domestic and industrial accidents was greater, the socio-medical profile of road accidents was considerably higher, in part because these accidents were not confined to specific geographical areas and therefore presented severe obstacles to medical planning.56
Allied to this troublesome spatial aspect of motor vehicle accidents was the financial spectre they raised. Indeed, to most medical commentators, what mattered more than the facilities for dealing with these accidents was the problem of how to recoup from insurance companies the costs of treating the victims. The BMA reckoned that doctors were paid in only one out of five cases; and in 1931, it was estimated that some 25,000 victims of motor accidents treated as in-patients in voluntary hospitals had cost nearly ( one-quarter of a million pounds.57 This problem, which was to be taken up by Moynihan in the House of Lords in 1933, was partly solved by the Road Traffic Act of 1934,58 but the general issue of recovering costs for accident victims who were covered by insurance for other than hospital medical services remained contentious (particularly so in the 1930s in relation to patients hospitalized for accidents who were in receipt of workmen's compensation benefits). Lobby groups such as the British (Voluntary) Hospitals Association were adamant that the insurance companies should be made to pay.59 There was little consideration, however, of the possible ill-effects ofallowing private insurance companies to enter into medical care as independent third-parties. On the contrary; especially for those with a special interest in the treatment of injuries who felt themselves peripheral to the core of hospital medicine-above all, of course, the orthopaedic advocates of fracture services-there were evident professional benefits to be had through the exploitation of this potential source of independent funding. This was demonstrated by American hospital experience in the 19 1Os and early 1920s;60 but the example that was to outshine all others was the Vienna Accident Hospital, established (in 1925) and entirely maintained by the Austrian National Insurance Company. A more positive influence than either the report of the King's Fund or the concern with motor accidents, the Vienna Accident Hospital also had a more decided effect on the orthopaedic advocates of fracture clinics.
BOHLER'S ACCIDENT HOSPITAL
The Vienna Accident Hospital was a fully equipped 125-bed institution that had been organized by Lorenz Bohler, a general surgeon who had developed a special interest in the treatment of fractures during the war. Like Platt, Bohler had become a propagandist of segregated fracture treatment, and he too appreciated the need to attend to the arguments of the opponents of this specialization. Thus, through an impressive accumulation of statistics, unique for the time, Bohler was to prove not only that fracture cases were better and more economically treated in his hospital than elsewhere, but also, that, despite the large number of cases he treated, his specialist work posed no threat to the supply of fracture cases to general surgeons in 57 had Bohler demonstrated the clinical advantages of specialized fracture treatment in restoring patients to their full earning capacity, and hence proved the social value of this work, but also, while proving to the insurance companies that surgical specialization could render enormous savings, he had further demonstrated to enterprising hospital administrators that such specialization could be a paying proposition. That the Vienna Accident Hospital had "saved the insurance societies something in the neighbourhood of £18,000" was just the sort of "astonishing" fact to stimulate interest in the whole question of accident services and, at the same time, to draw attention to the "grave scandal" that in Britain the insurance companies "contribute nothing towards the treatment of their injured clients in hospital". "Both equity and self-interest alike", the Lancet maintained in its editorial, "should lead the companies to support an accident department in every hospital".
Not surprisingly, it was precisely this conclusion that was also insisted upon by the orthopaedic advocates of segregated fracture services, who naturally found in B6hler's work a great source of justification for their professional cause. Ernest Hey Groves, who was more insistent than most about the need to convince British insurance companies "that organisation of fracture treatment would effect so much saving in compensation as more than to cover the costs of treatment",64 translated Bohler's work on fractures into English. In his preface, he noted that Bohler had "demonstrated that the proper treatment offractures is not only a scientific problem or a philanthropic duty, but also a business proposition. In other words, it pays to treat fractures well!"65
Because the legitimation oforthopaedic specialization was implicit in any discussion of Bohler 70 As recalled, significantly, in an editorial on 'The treatment of fractures', Br. med. J., 1927, ii: 695. In America in the 1930s, orthopaedic surgeons were increasingly fearful that their specialism would be diluted and its borders blurred if too much work was devoted to the "attractive and lucrative treatment of traumatic claims. Rather, it was by putting accident hospitals forward as one option among others that, at one and the same moment, they exploited the wider social and political issue ofaccident services, and served their own interest in hospital fracture services. To do this, the orthopaedic reformers simply reinforced the point made by the Lancet in 1926, that the administrative difficulties and costs involved in establishing separate accident hospitals made it more sensible to try to develop accident departments in existing general hospitals.7' While explaining the difficulties involved in establishing separate accident hospitals, they revealed the economic viability of hospital fracture clinics. This was how Hey Groves presented the case for fracture clinics to the LCC in the mid-1930s.72 Around the same time, in an address on 'Broken bones and money wasted' to the National Safety Council, he proceeded further along the road to making an economic virtue of necessity: "To avoid all the muddle and inefficiency it was not necessary first to provide a large special hospital devoted to accidents [The Times reported]. The principles of organisation were comparatively simple and cheap; they required no new buildings nor any capital expenditure."73 Hence, when the medical officer at St James' Hospital, Balham, William Gissane, tried to win the LCC over to the idea of separate "Units [of 100 to 150 beds] for Traumatic Surgery" instead of "fracture clinics", and offered to take a £200 cut in his salary in order to be able to direct such a unit, he was dismissed as an idealist and branded a bad character interested only in furthering his own career.74 "My present enthusiasm", he had explained, "is not a mushroom growth following a hard working four week visit to Dr. Throughout the 1930s, orthopaedists continued to argue that the private insurance companies ought to be induced or be compelled by "legal enactment" to support fracture services. But hopes for tangible results from this quarter steadily diminished. As pointed out at a meeting in the Ministry of Health in 1930, the insurance companies were simply not interested in arguments for the more efficient treatment of fractures: "[they] simply say that so far as they are concerned, it is a question of finance, and the premiums are so regulated that they cover even the most expensive case. Any attempt on the part of the doctors or the hospitals to reduce the period of incapacity would merely mean that employers would press for a lower premium and the Insurance Company would be no better off than before. We cannot hope, therefore, for much help in the way ofsecuring improved treatment from the Insurance Companies."79 The official line of the insurance companies, as the Federated Employers Insurance Association told Hey Groves in 1936, was that by the terms of the legislation on workmen's compensation, they were unable "to do anything more than pay the compensation so fixed",80 but the real problem seems to have been the competition between the insurers themselves. A representative of one of the companies pointed out 76 in 1935: "while certain insurance corporations might very well be inclined to put up considerable sums for rehabilitation work they were held back by the consideration that their action would be benefiting other companies which were not contributing at all.,,81
Increasingly, therefore, orthopaedists came to realize that only through state initiatives and through public funding would fracture and rehabilitation services be effectively implemented. Through their work with crippled children (which involved remuneration from the Board of Education, Ministry of Health, and Local Authorities), they were already accustomed and well disposed to the benefits of state support. The virtues of state involvement and assistance were made strikingly apparent, moreover, in the contrast between, on the one hand, the relatively positive response to accident and fracture services on the part of the county council and municipal hospital authorities and, on the other hand, the generally reluctant attitude towards them and their co-ordination on the part of the voluntary hospitals. In London, some of the larger voluntary hospitals (partly for reasons of autonomy, but mostly because of financial constraints) had actually gone so far as to make arrangements for sending their fracture cases to those LCC hospitals where segregated fracture services had been established.82 "One almost fears that nothing short of some social cataclysm, such as Communism, bankruptcy, or war, will be strong enough to break old prejudices", complained Hey Groves in 1933, after a frustrating and futile attempt to secure the co-operation of the voluntary hospitals in Bristol. 83 Honigsbaum has claimed that it was the recognition of these obstacles to fracture clinics and, hence, to the place (and/or greater standing) oforthopaedists within British teaching hospitals, that led the orthopaedists to be "the 'radicals' of the medical profession" pressing for the entire reorganization of the health services.84 Such a claim is valid, at least in the absence of further detailed studies of the politics of the medical profession in this period, and especially if one is referring-as Honigsbaum is-to the outspoken Liverpool orthopaedist, fracture expert, and leading BOA political activist from the mid-1930s, Reginald Watson hospitals into becoming publicly accountable and (via the capital that hopefully would become available for the development of modern scientific techniques and procedures) to their coming further under the control and direction of "medical experts". The 1929 Local Government Act, Hey Groves believed, had "gone a long way toward making possible a general unification of the hospital system", but because the Act had left the financial structure ofthe voluntary hospitals intact, the lay managers of these hospitals could still use "any excuse or justification for behaving as though they controlled a proprietary institution".88 At root, therefore, state aid was the means to undermine the authority that was seen as blocking not just the particular interests of the orthopaedists but, more generally, the reformist principles they held dear and generally applicable: uniformity of procedure, co-ordination of specialist effort, and control by medical experts. Socialized medicine was clearly not the object; to seek state support for voluntary hospitals in order to facilitate their control by consultant specialists was to occupy a middle ground between voluntarism and statism-a ground potentially as free from bossy state bureaucrats and Medical Officers of Health as from proprietorial hospital governors.
The occupation of this middle ground was not unique to orthopaedists and, in fact, in his Harveian Oration, Hey Groves hardly referred to their interests specifically. Yet it was their interests above all that were served by the argument for state aid. However essential public funding was for the modernization of voluntary hospitals, it was even more essential for future specialists in fracture work, since (unlike most of the senior orthopaedic surgeons advocating fracture services in the 1930s), they could expect to have little time for remunerative private consulting. Clearly, to establish firmly and maintain the sought-after niche in the high-status voluntary hospitals, it was necessary at the same time to secure salaries on at least a part-time basis. (In view of the diminishing state-remunerated work with crippled children, this financial need was all the more pressing.) The BMA, prior to the TUC in 1922, had recommended salaries for the volume of autobiography, London, Hutchinson, 1967, pp. 167-168, 171). However, when it came to implementing the NHS, by which time his private practice in London was large and world famous, he argued for restraint and turned against a full salaried service: "We want freedom from medical control, and that freedom demands private practice. I saw the abolition of such freedom in Russia, and it has meant the end of medical progress in that country": 'The consultant's vote', Br. med. J., 1948, i: 264-267 at p. 266. 86 Honigsbaum, op. cit., note 47 above, p. 240. 87 'Should medicine be a mendicant? A review of our hospital service', Lancet, 1930, i: 1107. See resident staffs ofvoluntary hospitals, but no one had recommended that consultants be "salaried".89 Before the mid-1930s, the idea was virtually unthinkable within the voluntary sector, and even in the LCC's hospitals it was not until the mid-1930s that the practice was begun on a small scale (though there were, of course, payments for consulting surgeons).90 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Hey Groves and other advocates of orthopaedic specialization in the early 1930s did not specifically refer to the state remuneration of fracture "experts" when they urged the voluntary hospitals to enter into a relationship with the state that was not unlike that then existing for the BBC and the universities. To have done so would have weakened their case in certain quarters and generally have played up the fact (appreciated by a sub-committee of the Voluntary Hospitals Committee for London in a report of 1939 on Organisedfracture services for London) that "the voluntary hospitals are being called upon to play a prominent part in what is virtually a new type of service and that payment of whole-time directors of registrars will inevitably involve additional expense".9
Connected to the reason why orthopaedists did not press for salaried service in the early 1930s (and, paradoxically, a part of the reason why thereafter they increasingly became advocates of state involvement in hospitals) was their rising hope that financial and moral support for their fracture cause might be forthcoming from the private sector-in particular from large industry. Such hopes had indeed existed from the very beginning of the fracture movement and had been nourished in the 1920s by American examples of industry-based accident and rehabilitation services.92 It was not until the early 1930s, however, as a result of a notable British example, that the orthopaedic reformers began in earnest to make their pitch to industrialists. professional body seeking entry into the teaching hospitals were not interested in industrial medicine as such, they found Moore's work useful in campaigning against the social and economic evils of the so-called "wastage" of industrial labour through medical incompetence. On the basis of Moore's work, it was argued that it was economically advantageous (for large self-insured companies at least) to have industrial injuries, and fractures in particular, treated by experts in order to avoid the unnecessary legal bother and expense ofworkmen's compensation claims and to avoid as well, purported malingering.94
Very largely, this was how the case was put in the appendix to the BMA's influential 'Report on fractures' of 1935.95 Since Moore and Maitland were among those who made up the committee that produced the report (along with Bristow and Hey Groves), the bias is hardly surprising. Yet beyond alerting employers to the issue of fractures, the pitch had little effect. In a context of high unemployment and cheap labour, few employers were seriously concerned about labour "wastage". Moreover, few employers were like Cunard Steamships or the LMS Railway in carrying their own insurance risks, and they therefore had as little incentive as the insurance companies to become directly involved with fracture treatment as a means to economy.
Ironically, the BMA's 'Report on fractures' made its deepest impact not among the managers of industry, but among organized labour (though, as we have seen, there were long-standing reasons why organized labour, and the TUC in particular, should have responded favourably).96 Ignoring the overtures of orthopaedists to industrialists, labour leaders took up the cause not only because of the serious effect of fractures on workers' wages and job retention, but also because here was an issue on the financial and social importance of which there was wide public agreement,97 it was a means to restate the accident-service rationale for a unified and "classless" hospital service, centrally co-ordinated and regionally administered and financed. Thus the TUC and Labour Party made fracture services a part of their political platform on health care and, jointly with the orthopaedists (officially through the BMA), presented a memorandum on rehabilitation and industrial injury to the government's InterDepartmental Committee in December 1937.98 Drafted and promoted by WatsonJones, the memorandum called for the deployment of experts in orthopaedic and traumatic surgery. It was subsequently presented to the (Hetherington) Royal Commission on Workmen's Compensation at its sittings of 1939-40, and, in general, its point of view and its emphasis on rehabilitation were taken up in the Beveridge Report and other pieces of war-and post-war legislation. 99 This is not the place fully to enter into the social and political nature of the rapport between the TUC and Labour Party and the orthopaedic reformers, nor to dwell on the interesting resonances and ambiguities in the use of the term "rehabilitation".100
Suffice to say here that the connexion with the TUC and Labour Party tempered the orthopaedists' pursuit of industrialists and encouraged them further along the road to state involvement in health care.
EFFECTS AND MEANINGS
If measured by the number of the hospital fracture clinics established before the Second World War, the orthopaedists' campaign for fracture services would have to be reckoned, at best, only a partial success. The government's (Delevigne) InterDepartmental Committee on the Rehabilitation of Persons Injured by Accidents, after announcing in their Interim report of 1937 that there were "many indications that a widespread movement for the establishment offracture clinics has begun and is likely to make rapid headway", was forced to confess in its Final report of 1939 that "progress in the general application ofthem has not been as rapid as we hoped. The matter had been taken up in a number of places ... [but] the hope that a general movement had been started and would be carried through by the hospitals themselves, both voluntary and municipal individually or in co-operation, has not been realised."''°By 1939 only four out of twelve London teaching hospitals had fully developed fracture services, while 650 out of some 825 voluntary and municipal hospitals were still relying on "unorganized" general surgical routine for their fracture cases. Differences between hospitals, financial constraints, and the shortage of qualified fracture experts were among the many factors that held back the implementation and regional co-ordination of "ideal" fracture services.
More significant to the orthopaedic reformers than the findings of the Delevigne Committee, however, was the fact of its existence, and the fact that, despite its brief, it chose to concentrate exclusively on the issue of the organization of efficient fracture services. 102 Like the BMA's 'Report on fractures', the Delevigne reports, by reiterating the orthopaedists' social, therapeutic, and economic rationales for efficient fracture treatment, legitimated the professional self-interests behind them. Not only did the Delevigne Committee justify the control of fractures in the hands of "fracture experts",'03 but also, by complying with the notion that the voluntary hospitals were the most appropriate place for fracture clinics, it granted to orthopaedists the status and authority they had been seeking, and the basis for the reproduction of that authority through access to undergraduate teaching. Further, by recommending "departure from ordinary practice in respect of ... remuneration" in the form of honoraria of between £300 and £500 per annum to the surgeon-in-charge of a fracture clinic, the Committee came close to accepting a salaried service for orthopaedists within the voluntary sector.104
But the Delevigne reports have an importance beyond that for orthopaedists. They stand, with measures such as the Cancer Act of 1939, as evidence of government commitment to an organized, statutory health service which included medical specialists and their work in voluntary hospitals. Previously, where government had been involved in health-care activities (such as tuberculosis schemes and those for maternity and child welfare), the concentration was on "public health" conceived largely in terms of preventive-cum-"personal health services". By the 1930s, however, the focus of development for central government and for many Medical Officers of Health lay with curative services, including the development of municipal hospitals, their staffing with consultants, and their relations with the voluntary hospitals. In these discussions, which lasted through the Second World War, "medical rationalizers" played a key role-some of whom were Medical Officers of Health, some of whom were medical academics, and several of the most active of whom were specialists who needed hospital rationalization to develop generally available services. Among the specialists (as Honigsbaum has observed) orthopaedists were conspicuous-an obvious and important example being Harry Platt, who was active on Manchester's Joint Hospitals Advisory Board before becoming involved, nationally, with the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust. That one of the first acts of the Joint Board in Manchester was the implementation of a regional fracture scheme, and that the first report (1939) ofthe Nuffield Trust outlined a scheme for a unified accident service 105 is not simply an indication of the influence and interests of Platt, however. Platt's career was typical ofseveral contemporary would-be specialists who similarly moved through the small voluntary hospitals to regional hospital centres to involvement with the organization of the National Health Service.106 In considering these parallel careers, what emerges clearly is not the particular, but the general importance of the orthopaedic case. Accidents, like cancer, were on a new frontier of "public health"-a frontier that was part and parcel of the argument for rationalization and specialization. From this wider perspective, the reports by the BMA and the Delevigne committees appear less as orthopaedic reports in government dress, than as particular instances of the reformist stratagems of consultant specialists.
Clearly, then, the campaign for segregated hospital fracture services under orthopaedic specialists was about much more than meeting the need in interwar Britain for improved fracture treatment. As an emotive social issue into which could be drawn major interest groups from outside medicine,'07 the fracture issue provided one of the most visible and compelling of the arguments for technical expertise-an argument that could and was used to legitimate the reform of hospitals and the medical services as a whole. In this sense, the fracture movement did indeed "sanctify a cause". It is not surprising, therefore, that the investigation of the fracture movement illuminates various key aspects in the transformation to the hospital system of mid-twentiethcentury Britain.
